In 1978, Chinese state reformers began to implement widespread economic and industrial reforms, including reform of firm finance and the banking system. Part of this reform was an effort to strengthen the central bank and to transform the four specialized banks that reported to the central bank. The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) was separated from the Ministry of Finance and became the central bank in 1984. The PBOC gradually assumed control of the money supply and began to set monetary policy, regulate exchange rates, and otherwise oversee the financial system. Under the central bank, four specialized banks emerged as financial intermediaries. The Industrial and Commercial Bank, the Agricultural Bank, the People’s Bank, and the Construction Bank remained government agencies but they gradually began to accept deposits and to lend capital independent of government intervention. Although their names identified the specialized banks with particular segments of the economy, the banks were free to lend to firms in all industries. Firms applied for funds, and their requests were increasingly evaluated on the merit of the firm and the application, with decreasing regard for government policy. Yet these banks remained government agencies, and their lending at times reflected state policy more than the financial objectives of the bank (Goldie-Scott, 1995; Yi,1994).
During reform, firms began to seek non-state sources of funding both because the state was reducing its financial support of the firms and because borrowing from non-state sources was becoming more attractive than state funds. As early as 1980, reformers warned firms that direct transfers of state funds would be reduced and eventually discontinued entirely (Goldie-Scott, 1995). Early reductions in state funds signaled that reform was genuine, and a handful of early, visible bankruptcies underscored this message. In even the largest firms, the state began to transform its role from sole owner to that of a shareholder with limited responsibility and limited liability (Jefferson and Xu, 1991). While the state did not stop direct transfers completely, managers were increasingly aware that financing the firm was their responsibility. At the same time, financial autonomy was attractive to managers and created incentives for them to voluntarily seek non-state sources of capital. Supply shortages, uncertainty about levels of state funding, the need to bargain for favorable treatment, and the disincentives associated with having profits be redirected to nonprofitable firms increased the appeal of external funding, particularly for firms that were performing relatively well financially.
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